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Capitalizing on recent improvements in the availability 
of cross-country financial sector data, this paper proposes 
a standard methodology for benchmarking the policy 
component of financial development. Systematic 
controls are introduced to isolate main structural country 
characteristics and a principal components analysis is 
used to help identify a parsimonious set of ten “core” 
outcome indicators from a broader set of twenty seven 
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potential indicators covering different dimensions of 
development in both financial institutions and financial 
markets. Such a broad-based approach helps reveal 
important determinants and regularities of the process 
of financial development. The paper also identifies some 
of the main data gaps that will need to be filled to allow 
further progress in financial benchmarking looking 
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For almost 10 years, the World Bank and the IMF have been undertaking the Financial 
Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP) across the developed and developing world, with 
the objective of evaluating the stability and efficiency of financial systems. Some of the 
most significant potential benefits of FSAP-type studies of financial systems derive from 
viewing a country’s performance in the light of international experience. Financial 
development benchmarking can give policy makers a better sense of how different 
components of their financial system are performing relative to other countries. This can 
help countries identify lagging areas possibly in need of policy reform. Inversely, good 
performance may be the result of sound and creative policies that other countries might 
wish to learn from and emulate.  
 
Yet, the use of quantitative benchmarks on financial development has been thus far 
generally limited and of uneven quality and usefulness. Most often, the country is 
compared to a limited and arbitrary set of comparator countries that may be at very 
different stages of economic development or have very different structural characteristics. 
Hence, the policy implications of cross-country differences are unclear. Moreover, 
benchmarking is neither systematic across sectors or dimensions of financial 
development nor supported by a consistent and uniform set of good quality data that 
facilitates comparisons. 
 
These shortcomings result only in part from data limitations on financial development 
indicators (FDIs). While important gaps no doubt remain in FDI data coverage (for 
example as regards bank outreach, non-bank institutions, or bond market indicators), the 
availability and sophistication of financial sector data, both from official sources and 
private sources, has increased abruptly in recent years. Substantial efforts have been 
made, by official agencies (including the Fund and the World Bank) as well as private 
organizations, to collect and produce financial indicators of increasing variety across 
large samples of countries through a number of primary or secondary databases.
2  
 
This paper intends therefore to capitalize on these initiatives and help fill in some of the 
benchmarking gap by: 
•  proposing a standard methodology for financial development benchmarking; 
•  narrowing down the set of possible FDIs, based on current data availability, to ten 
core indicators; 
•  identifying some of the main remaining information and analytical gaps and 
possible ways to fill these up looking ahead. 
 
The paper starts by discussing the rationale for using outcome indicators that measure 
features such as size, efficiency and outreach. The use of such “intermediate” indicators 
                                                 
2 In particular, the World Bank has made, through the interconnected DECRG, FSDI and Financing Growth 
databases, important progress in putting together a comprehensive set of financial indicators across 
different sectors and dimensions of development.  
  2is contrasted to that of primary indicators that measure the quality of inputs underlying 
financial development, or final indicators that measure its welfare impact. 
 
The paper then discusses the benefits of expanding comparisons across the broadest 
possible set of countries and the rationale for systematically controlling for those country 
characteristics that have an important bearing on financial development but can be taken 
as given in the short-term. This may be because these features are policy invariant or, if 
partly endogenous (as is the case, for example, of per capita income and poverty), 
respond to policy only with a lag. In either case, policy should remain at least partially 
embedded into the residuals. Hence, the regression residuals (even though they are not 
meant to explain or predict) can help countries compare themselves to others in a way 
that is informative about the relative quality of their underlying policy environment.   
 
The paper applies the same filtering methodology to a broad set of 27 possible indicators 
pre-selected on the basis of the information currently available. In addition to helping 
assess the quality of the underlying data, such a broad-based approach also helps reveal 
important determinants and regularities of the process of financial development. For 
example, it helps identify the dimensions or sectors that are most affected by returns to 
scale, population density or other country-specific features (such as whether the country 
is an offshore center or an oil producer). At the same time, the correlations of residuals 
across indicators help highlight the extent to which different indicators are inter-linked 
(possibly reflecting underlying constraints of financial development) or respond similarly 
to changes in the policy environment. The comparison of income elasticities across a 
broad spectrum of indicators also provides revealing clues about the order with which 
different features of financial development are likely to emerge as economic development 
proceeds. 
 
A methodology for selecting from this broader array of possible indicators a more 
parsimonious and efficient set of core indicators is then presented. The core set is chosen 
based on the general quality and coverage of the underlying data, as well as a principal 
components analysis that identifies its significance for mapping key dimensions of 
financial development.  
 
For the sake of brevity, this paper does not present the more user-oriented components of 
the benchmarking analysis undertaken in the context of the FSAP review project that 
motivated this study. These include in particular a methodology to rank countries within 
comparable peer groups and a standardized template (to be posted on the web) that 
presents the core financial indicators for a large sample of countries over the period 1980-
2006. Interested readers are referred to the companion paper (Beck et al, 2008) that 
discusses these aspects more fully. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses methodological issues. 
Section III presents the results. Section IV concludes by emphasizing ways to overcome 
the data limitations of this exercise and discussing possible extensions. 
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II. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
a. Why look at FDIs? 
 
A large empirical literature has shown the importance of financial sector development for 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Countries with higher levels of financial 
development grow faster and experience faster reductions in poverty levels.
3 Finance is 
thus not only pro-growth, but also pro-poor. This calls for policy makers’ attention 
towards policies that promote financial development, which in turn requires that the latter 
be defined and measured properly.    
 
The core activity of financial systems is to engage into financial contracts through which 
individual agents exchange money today for the promise of money or risk coverage 
tomorrow. To facilitate this enormous leap of faith into an uncertain future, financial 
institutions and markets provide two key accompanying services: i) by acquiring and 
processing information about borrowers (including enterprises) and possible investment 
projects, they help allocate society’s savings and risk absorption capacity to their most 
productive use; and ii) by helping monitor the use of funds and exerting corporate 
governance, they limit the scope for moral hazard and a wasteful use of resources. At the 
same time, financial institutions also provide transactional (payment and trading) 
services that ease the preparation, trading and payment of financial contracts, as well as 
the exchange of goods and services.  
 
Financial systems do not function in a vacuum, however. Instead, their performance 
depends on a proper enabling environment, whose key components include: i) a sound 
and effective contractual framework that appropriately defines and enforces creditor and 
debtor rights; ii) a smooth information framework, including accounting and auditing 
standards, and effective arrangements for debtor and collateral information sharing; iii) 
adequate macroeconomic management, including a sound fiscal policy, a transparent and 
credible monetary policy, and deep government bond markets; iv) competitive and 
contestable markets; and v) effective prudential oversight, including a well-functioning 
safety net.
4 Indeed, it is the enabling environment, rather than financial development in 
itself, which is directly influenced by policy. The chain of causality goes therefore from 
policy to the enabling environment to financial sector development to economic 
development and welfare, with clear feedback processes along the chain (Figure 1).  
 
Given that financial development is one step removed from policy, the question arises as 
to why benchmarking it matters for policy purposes. Indeed, the alternative would be to 
focus exclusively on measuring and benchmarking progress in improving the enabling 
environment, perhaps using indicators such the Doing Business indicators or other 
enabling environment indicators (EEIs). The policy process could then limit itself to 
improving those indicators irrespective of how well or how poorly the financial system is 
doing.  
                                                 
3 See for example, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007). 
4 See Beck (2006) for a literature survey on policies associated with financial sector deepening. 
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However, the links between policy, the enabling environment, financial development, and 
welfare are complex. Moreover, although a legal framework, say creditor rights, may 
look adequate on paper, it may be ineffective in practice due to poor enforcement or 
because it does not reflect well some peculiar characteristics of the local environment or 
does not fit well with other idiosyncratic elements of the legal framework. Thus, 
identifying the key policy inputs (the weakest linkages in the enabling environment) is 
not a straightforward exercise. Assessing the possible final welfare impact of reforming 
them is even less trivial.   
 













FDIs can thus help bridge the gap between policy and final objectives. Unlike in 
monetary policy where Taylor rules directly and unequivocally link policy (the interest 
rate) to welfare (inflation), there are no such rules in the case of financial development. 
Instead, given the rather complicated links between policy, the enabling environment, 
financial development, and welfare, FDIs can function as “intermediate” indicators and 
targets, much as in the case of monetary intermediate targets before the advent of modern 
inflation targeting. They can help detect what functions may be under-provided and 
sectors or instruments under-developed. This in turn can provide revealing clues as to 
where to look for in identifying possible gaps and key under-performing components of 
the enabling environment. At the same time, FDIs can help isolate and assess the impact 
of policy over time. As in the case of monetary policy, however, the intermediate (FDI) 
indicators are most effective when used in conjunction with the more operational (EEI) 
indicators. 
 
b. Why compare across time and countries? 
 
Financial development is a time-bound process. While there are a few cases where shocks 
exogenous to the economy or disastrous government policies have resulted in a lowering 
of financial development, in most cases, financial sectors become more developed over 
time. However, the pace of development can vary substantially from country to country 
and from segment to segment of the financial market, depending in part of course on 
economic growth, but also on the specific progress made in any particular country in 
  5reforming and improving the enabling environment. Monitoring how financial indicators 
evolve (i.e., benchmarking the country’s progress over time) can therefore provide key 
inputs towards assessing the adequacy of the policy environment.   
 
This dynamic benchmarking becomes more revealing when supported by systematic 
cross-country comparisons that allow policy makers to assess how well they are doing 
relative to other countries with similar structural characteristics and at a similar stage of 
economic development. One approach is to compare countries only against their 
immediate peers, i.e., countries that have the most similar characteristics. However, this 
can severely restrict the scope of the benchmarking exercise, thereby hindering its 
significance and statistical validity. Instead, because financial systems across countries 
fulfill similar functions and face similar constraints, one would expect the process of 
financial development to be broadly comparable across all countries and stages of 
development once proper controls are introduced.
5   
 
Despite its endogeneity, we include per capita income as a key structural control. 
Economic development should clearly affect financial development, both due to demand-
side effects (the volume and sophistication of financial activity increases with income 
levels) and supply-side effects (larger, richer economies can achieve economies of scale 
and benefit from more competition and better infrastructure). Thus, richer countries have 
deeper, more efficient and broader financial systems, a relationship that holds both across 
countries and over time.
6 However, economic development is itself endogenous to 
financial development, creating a problem of identification.
7  
 
As long as the impact of financial development on economic development is lagged (so 
that policy improvements affect financial development before financial development 
affects economic development), policy should not be already fully captured by the 
                                                 
5 Notice that the need for controls is more acute for FDIs, as the volume of financial activity is clearly 
process-dependent (i.e., influenced by demand), than for EEIs, which are instead mostly supply-based (one 
would expect some feedback from financial development to the quality of the enabling environment but 
these effects should be relatively less dominant).  
6 Notice however that not all dimensions of financial development may grow linearly with economic 
development. For example, the volume of banking activity, as measured by on balance sheet credit, may 
actually decline as financial systems become more sophisticated, reflecting the growth of new instruments 
(securitization) or new forms of (non-bank) intermediation. Provided there is enough data (i.e., a sufficient 
number of countries is already on the declining portion of the curve), the estimations can be adjusted for 
such non-linearities.     
7 Granger causality tests, exploiting high-frequency data, help analyze the causality direction between 
financial and economic development. Using data for different countries and different sample periods, no 
unambiguous consensus has arisen from this literature. Most papers find that financial development 
predicts GDP per capita, with some papers finding that GDP per capita also predicts financial development.  
Comparing the strength of the relationships between financial and economic development, Calderon and 
Liu (2003) find a stronger effect from financial to economic development than vice versa.  However, they 
also find that the strength of the finance-GDP per capita link increases as the time horizon increases, 
suggesting that the feedback from economic to financial development is stronger for shorter than for longer 
time horizons. 
  6income term and remain instead at least partially embedded into the residual.
8 To see 
this, consider the following simple canonic representation: 
 
                      t t t t P Y X ε β α + + =                                                        (1) 
 
                                                                                    (2) 
'
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                      t t t v P P + = −1 " α                                                              (3) 
 
Where X is a financial indicator, Y is per capita income, and P is the policy environment. 
Hence, (1) indicates that the level of financial development at time t is a function of the 
level of economic development, the quality of the policy environment, and a stochastic 
residual. On the other hand, (2) accounts for the fact that economic development at time t 
is affected by policy at time t-1. Finally, (3) reflects the fact that good policies today are 
probably rooted in good policies yesterday but may incorporate a policy innovation term 
v. Substituting P in (1) using (2) and (3) leads to the following reduced form expression: 
 
                                  (4)  )] ' / " ( [ ) ' / " (
'
t t t t t v Y X ε α βα ε β α βα α − + + + =
 
Thus, the total impact of policy on financial development should exceed that embedded 
in the residuals (e.g., there is an omitted variables bias that should translate into an over-
estimation of the income coefficient and an under-estimation of policy). However, the 
residual term of a regression in which policy is not accounted includes the policy 
innovation term. Moreover, provided the dynamics of transmission of policy on income 
are similar across countries (a reasonable assumption, at least for countries with similar 
characteristics), the stochastic component of the residual,  , should be 
comparable across countries. Hence, comparing across countries the residuals obtained 
from (4) should provide, within some confidence interval reflecting the underlying 
stochastic noise, a measure of the quality of a country’s policies. 
' ' / " t t ε α βα ε −
 
We also systematically control for differences across countries as regards poverty and 
income distribution. Indeed, reflecting access constraints, one would expect countries 
where income is less evenly distributed, resulting in more poverty, to have relatively less 
developed financial systems. The relationship between poverty and financial 
development is also a two-way street, however, with financial development also helping 
to overcome poverty. But, as for per capita income, the impact of poverty on financial 
development should be mostly contemporaneous while that of financial development on 
poverty would be expected to be lagged. Hence, one would expect financial development 
to precede reductions in poverty. If so, as in the case of economic development, 
                                                 
8 While financial development has a supply-side impact on economic growth over the medium-term, the 
reverse link from GDP per capita to financial activity is mostly demand-based and shorter term. Notice also 
that, should we have sufficient instrumental variables to perfectly isolate the endogenous component of 
income, it might be better to use these rather than income to isolate the impact of policy. However, the 
standard set of instrumental variables that is usually utilized (legal origin, distance from the equator, etc.) is 
only of limited help in this respect. 
  7controlling for poverty should help neutralize its direct impact on financial development, 
thereby enhancing the link between the regression’s residuals and policy.  
 
Some additional controls are needed to control for key structural characteristics such as 
size (as determined by population), population density, or cross-border operations. More 
densely populated countries have deeper financial systems, reflecting lower infrastructure 
costs, such as communications and branch networks. On the other hand, reflecting scale 
and networking effects, key components of financial development may be lagging in 
smaller economies, relative to larger countries at comparable levels of economic 
development. A substantial exception needs to be made, however, for offshore financial 
centers whose financial systems are comparatively larger than would be warranted in 
relation to the size of their economy. Inversely, oil exporters tend to have smaller 
financial sectors than non oil exporters with similar levels of income, reflecting the fact 
that: i) oil exports can boost GDP without requiring a proportional increase in economic 
and financial activity; and ii) the heavier reliance on international trade enhances cross-
border financial activity at the expense of domestic intermediation. 
 
Finally, the question arises as to whether regional controls should also be introduced. To 
the extent that regional differences reflect deeply ingrained cultural or sociological 
characteristics, there is a good argument in favor of introducing such controls. However, 
regional differences may also reflect policy differences. As the latter are not necessarily 
set in stone, there are clear benefits to comparing countries across regions without 
adjusting for regional effects. In practice, it is most informative to provide both types of 
benchmarks (with and without regional controls).   
 
c. Which benchmarks? 
 
The most natural way of measuring a financial system’s performance would be along 
functional lines, i.e., how well it fulfills each of the key functions (underlined above) that 
it is supposed to deliver. In particular, where one form of intermediation may gradually 
replace another but the timing of the transition is uncertain, functional indicators should 
be more stable and predictable than institution or market-based indicators. In some cases, 
functions can arguably be measured in a meaningful way. For example, the financial 
system’s capacity to provide effective transactional services could be assessed based on 
key statistics on payment services or core broker systems.  
 
However, functions such as the ability to contract away resources from lenders to 
borrowers, efficiently allocate risk among market participants, exert appropriate 
governance, or ensure an adequate extraction and use of information, are hard to define, 
and much harder if not impossible to measure, at least based on the information currently 
available. Should sufficient micro data be available at the firm and household level, one 
could attempt to measure financial performance based on the level of services agents are 
provided with (i.e., whether they have access to the services they need at a fair price). But 
the availability of such data at this time is too sparse to be used meaningfully.   
 
  8In turn, the use of institutional and market data confronts one with hard choices as to 
whether and how to separate or aggregate the data. In particular, the question arises of 
whether the claims on the private sector by non-bank financial intermediaries, such as 
finance and leasing companies or institutional investors, are sufficiently close substitutes 
to those of banks that they can simply be added.
9 A related question is whether data 
across different types of institutional investors should be aggregated or considered 
separately. The fact that pension funds, insurance companies, and investment funds all 
contribute to storing and managing long term savings, with their relative importance 
largely reflecting different regulatory and institutional settings across the world, would 
argue in favor of aggregation. On the other hand, however, mutual funds assets are 
usually of shorter maturities and rotate more than those of contractual savings 
institutions, which tend to buy and hold. Ultimately, these are empirical issues that should 
be resolved based on the data, i.e., on whether aggregating the data provides a more 
stable and predictable construct than considering individual components separately. 
 
Within each channel (institution or market) of financial intermediation, one would also 
ideally wish to differentiate according to the most relevant “qualities” of financial 
development, such as size, reach, efficiency (or liquidity), and soundness. Size can be 
measured in terms of deposits, credit or total assets.
10 Reach refers to the availability of 
services across geographic areas and income segments. Efficiency, as measured by 
spreads, refers to the efficient use of resources in intermediation. Liquidity is a closely 
related dimension that is particularly important to assess market development. Soundness 
refers to the sustainability of financial services, institutions and markets and their 
resilience to exogenous shocks. While soundness is of course an essential feature of 
sustainable development, much work has already been invested in developing a battery of 
financial soundness indicators (FSIs). This paper will therefore restrict itself to the three 
other dimensions of developmental performance, on which much less has been written.
11 
 
Finally, criteria are needed to select the most meaningful indicator for each potential 
channel of intermediation and quality of development. A key feature of the core set is that 
it should be parsimonious and information-efficient. We will use the following five 
selection criteria: 
1.  Where available, any empirical evidence of direct linkages between a particular 
FDI and final welfare. For example, the fact that private credit to GDP performs 
best in predicting growth provides an important prior in favor of including this 
indicator in the core set.
12  
                                                 
9 Institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds) should in principle 
constitute a category on their own, both because the contracts they provide are substantially different from 
those provided by banks (in particular, they are generally of a much longer term nature and often 
contingent contracts) and because they do not invest their resources on a borrower by borrower basis but do 
it instead in the market or by placing the funds with banks and bank-like institutions. 
10 Notice that size is not necessarily synonymous of quality and diversity. Some countries could have 
relatively large financial systems but with limited services while others could be smaller but offer a more 
sophisticated and complete array of services. 
11 On FSIs, see IMF (2007). 
12 The finance and growth literature has relied mostly on financial sector indicators with longer time series.  
Specifically, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) show a robust link between financial sector development and 
  92.  The  goodness of fit of the structural regression estimates, as reflected in the 
overall R-square. Since the policy component should affect indicators that are 
meant to measure the same underlying quality of financial development in a 
broadly similar way, differences in fit should mostly reflect differences in data 
quality or unexplained structural characteristics. In either case, the indicator with 
the best fit (i.e., with less background noise) is likely to be the one providing the 
better policy benchmark. 
3.  The factor loading of the indicator along the principal component that measures 
the specific channel of intermediation and quality of development one wishes to 
assess. A higher loading in the principal component analysis (PCA) can be taken 
as an indication that a particular indicator does a better job at summing up the 
information relevant to that dimension. 
4.  The coverage (in years and countries) of each potential indicator. The broader the 
coverage, the better. 
5.  The ratio of within sample variance to between sample variance. An indicator that 
is stable from year to year for any given country, but varies substantially across 
countries, is better than one that does the opposite.
13  
 
III. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
a. Potential FDIs 
Based on current data availability, we pre-selected 27 potential core FDIs (the list, with 
sources and coverage, is provided in Table 1). In the absence of available indicators 
capturing the functionality of the financial system, we follow the commonly accepted 
breakdown by i) institutions (Banks and Institutional investors); and ii) markets (Equity 
and  Bonds). Institutional Investors are broken down into pension funds, insurance 
companies and mutual funds, bond markets into private and public.  
 
Where possible, we distinguish three potential dimensions of financial development: i) 
Size, which captures financial depth; ii) Efficiency, which captures the efficiency or 
liquidity with which financial services are delivered to the marketplace; and iii) Reach 
which measures the extent to which the financial system is accessible for the population 
(people or firms) as a whole. A two-dimensional matrix of sectors and dimensions is thus 
obtained. For each cell, we tried to identify at least three potential indicators. However, 
                                                                                                                                                 
economic growth and productivity growth, using Private Credit to GDP, Liquid Liabilities (M3) to GDP 
and other intermediation measures such as the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial 
and central bank assets and total domestic commercial bank assets to GDP. Levine and Zervos (1998) and  
Beck and Levine (2004) show that the stock market turnover ratio and stock market value traded to GDP 
are robustly linked to GDP per capita growth, while stock market capitalization to GDP is not.  Other 
papers using cross-country, industry-level and firm-level data have used the same or similar indicators 
proxying for total intermediation of the banking system or the size and liquidity of the stock market. Other 
indicators such as bank efficiency or outreach indicators have not been used by the growth literature due to 
the lack of long-term data series. 
13 High within-country variation may reflect measurement errors or high co-movements with the business 
cycle. Since it may be difficult to isolate the two and since FDIs are meant to measure longer-term 
differences across countries rather than fluctuations along the cycle for any given country, a lower ratio of 
between to within variance is preferable. 
  10some of the cells have less than three indicators or are outright empty, due to data 
limitations. This is the case in particular for institutional investors and the bond markets 
where current data limitations sharply restrict the scope for measuring efficiency and 
reach.  
 
Information on bank size indicators is generally good and a variety of possible indicators 
may be used. We included deposits, credit, and total (domestic) assets (all divided by 
GDP).
14 While credit and deposits would be expected to be fairly highly correlated, they 
measure conceptually different aspects of financial development (banking systems may 
be able to attract deposits without being able to channel them into credit). In the case of 
credit, we included both a narrow definition (claims on the private sector by deposit 
taking institutions) and a broad definition (claims on the private sector by deposit taking 
and other financial intermediaries). However, while the narrow definition has a very 
broad coverage (155 countries from 1960 to 2006), the broad definition is only currently 
available for a subset of 62 countries over a much more limited time period.
15  
 
On bank efficiency, three broadly available potential indicators were pre-selected: i) net 
interest margins to total earning assets; ii) operating costs to total assets; and iii) bank 
spreads. They measure closely related yet different dimensions of efficiency.
16 Spreads 
measure marginal efficiency, interest margins average efficiency.
17 Moreover, while 
operating costs are a pure measure of operational efficiency that includes all aspects of 
banking activity (including savings and payments), spreads and margins focus on 
intermediation exclusively and also include the profit margin of banks, thereby capturing 




As regards bank reach, we retained the following three indicators: i) number of ATMs; 
ii) number of bank deposits; and iii) number of bank branches, all relative to total 
population.
19 Again, these various indicators measure similar yet somewhat different 
features of access. Bank branches and ATMs per capita have a broader coverage across 
                                                 
14 The data is drawn from IFS but ratios are corrected for possible inflationary distortions reflecting stock-
flow problems. See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000).   
15 Work by the Fund’s Statistics Department to expand the coverage of this series is ongoing. 
16 Notice also that all three indicators are in-efficiency indicator rather than efficiency indicators (they all 
decline as banking systems become more efficient).  
17 Because deposit and lending rates are not averaged over all types of liabilities and assets, spreads 
measure the efficiency with which a marginal dollar is being intermediated. Hence, a bank whose funding 
relies primarily on unremunerated demand deposits could have a high net interest margin yet a low spread. 
18 The consistency of reporting standards on spreads is questionable across countries, particularly for older 
measurements. On the other hand, the bank sample on which margins and operating costs are drawn 
typically does not comprise all banks in a country. 
19 We also considered including in our study a synthetic measure of access that extrapolates to a broad 
sample of 138 countries survey data (available for 32 countries) on the percent of the adult population with 
access to some financial intermediary account, whether bank-based or microfinance-based (see Honohan, 
2006). This index has the substantial advantage of being closer to measuring the ultimate indicator, i.e., 
actual access to a financial account, and has a much broader coverage. However, while the approach 
appears to be promising, the index did not perform well in the principal components analysis, perhaps 
reflecting the need for some methodological fine tuning. 
  11countries than the number of bank deposits but are more transactions-oriented, may be 
more influenced by technological changes, and do not capture alternative forms of 
distribution such as correspondent banking, retail store cards, or internet-based services. 
On the other hand, an important potential drawback of the bank deposits indicators is its 
inability to discriminate between existing customers with multiple accounts and new 





Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Sector Dimension Definition Source Countries
Average number 
of obs. per 
country
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks to GDP Beck 2000 (IFS) 160 31
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions to GDP
Beck 2000 (IFS) 160 31
Bank Deposits to GDP Beck 2000 (IFS) 160 31
Bank Domestic Assets to GDP Beck 2000 (IFS) 160 31
(Interest Income – Interest Expense) / Earning 
Assets
Beck 2000 (BankScope) 160 12
Lending minus deposit rate IFS 152 6
Overhead Costs to Total Assets Beck 2000 (BankScope) 161 13
Synthetic Access Percentage Honohan (2006) 162 1
ATMs per 100,000 People Beck 2007 (Custom Survey) 89 1
Deposits per 1,000 People Beck 2007 (Custom Survey) 54 1
Branches per 100,000 People Beck 2007 (Custom Survey) 98 1
Stock Market Capitalization to GDP Beck 2000 (EMDB, IFS) 114 16
Stock Market Value Traded to GDP Beck 2000 (EMDB, IFS) 113 16
Value of Public Offerings to GDP WFE, IFS 47 6
Stock Return Synchronicity FSDI (Datastream, EMDB) 61 5
EFFICIENCY Stock Market Turnover Ratio Beck 2000 (EMDB, IFS) 112 16
Share Market Capitalization in Top 10 Firms FSDI (Datastream, EMDB) 76 5
Percentage of Closely Held Shares FSDI (Worldscope, EMDB) 49 6
Number of Listed Firms WDI 122 14
Private Bond Market to GDP Beck 2000 (BIS, IFS) 42 15
Public Bond Market Capitalization to GDP Beck 2000 (BIS, IFS) 49 15
Value of New Domestic Private Bonds to GDP WFE, IFS 43 5
Private Domestic Bond Market Turnover Ratio WFE, IFS 32 2
Public Domestic Bond Market Turnover Ratio WFE, IFS 31 2
Pension Fund Assets to GDP AIOS, ECB, FIAP, FSAP, 
OECD, WB Report, Various 
Central Bank Websites
79 4
Insurance Companies Assets to GDP ASSAL, Axco, ECB, FSAP, 
OECD, Various Central Bank 
Websites
97 4
Mutual Fund Assets to GDP ECB, FSAP, ICI, Various 
Central Bank Websites
61 8
Total Institutional Investors Assets to GDP AIOS, ASSAL, Axco, ECB, 
FIAP, FSAP, ICI, OECD, WB 




















                                                 
20 What is available was only recently obtained by the World Bank’s Research Department through a one-
time survey (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007). An important effort is currently underway to 
improve the database on access to finance (see Barr, Kumar and Litan, 2007). 
  12As regards institutional investors’ size, all indicators are based on the share of financial 
assets to GDP. Surprisingly, coverage is very uneven. While it is generally good for 
OECD countries, for other countries it is very spotty, particularly in the case of pension 
funds. However, by putting together data from a variety of sources, including data 
collected during FSAPs, we obtained a data set with reasonable coverage as regards the 
number of countries (103) albeit fairly limited in time (only one year for about half the 
sample). 
 
In the case of equity market size indicators, the pre-selected FDIs (all divided by GDP) 
included: i) market capitalization; ii) value traded; and iii) new issues. Market cap has the 
advantage of being more directly comparable to bank credit (both are stock variables); 
yet it is not robustly associated with cross-country variations in economic growth, 
possibly because it does not provide a good proxy of underlying market activity (some 
markets have large listings that never trade). Further, market cap does not reflect actual 
funding for companies, but rather the discounted expected future returns of shareholders, 
which may fluctuate widely over time. Hence value traded and new issues were also pre-
selected because they are flow variables that better reflect primary and secondary market 
activity. The new issues indicator, on the other hand, has the shortcoming that numbers 
might vary significantly over the years, especially in small markets. 
 
As regards equity market efficiency/liquidity, two indicators were pre-selected: i) 
turnover; and ii) price synchronicity. Turnover (value traded over market cap) has the 
advantage of a much broader coverage. However, it is a measure of market liquidity 
rather than market efficiency (while one would expect close correlations between the 
two, they are conceptually distinct). Price synchronicity (i.e., the extent to which all 
equity prices co-vary) is a more direct measure of market efficiency (in efficient markets, 
idiosyncratic information on individual prices should result in less synchronicity). 
However, it is much more information-intensive (hence prone to coverage limitations) 
and could be substantially affected by macroeconomic conditions. 
 
The set of potential equity market reach indicators was narrowed down to three: i) 
number of listed firms, divided by population;
21 ii) percent of total market capitalization 
accounted for by the 10 largest firms; and iii) percent of market capitalization accounted 
for by closely held shares. The first indicator measures reach in terms of breadth of use 
and could also be interpreted as a size indicator;
22 the last two are more closely related to 
measures of market concentration. For the listed-firms indicator, coverage is quite good 
(across both time and countries). 
 
Finally, as regards bonds market size indicators, the best available information (the stock 
of public and private bond issues, divided by GDP) comes from Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS). However, coverage is low (about 40 countries and 15 years of data). A 
flow indicator for new private bonds (new corporate issues) is also available. To reflect 
bond market liquidity (and efficiency), information on private and public bonds turnover 
                                                 
21 Should reliable information be available, the total number of firms (rather than the number of people) 
would be a better deflator. 
22  However, the correlation of listed firms with market capitalization is rather low (see Table 4). 
  13was also obtained from the World Federation of Exchanges. However, coverage is even 




The  raw  correlations between potential FDIs (shown separately for institutions and 
markets in Tables 2 and 3) are quite high This reflects the fact that the development of 
different markets and dimensions is affected by similar underlying determinants (both 
structural and policy-based) and proceeds on broadly parallel tracks as economies mature. 
This underlines the need for introducing structural controls. After some experimentation, 
the following set of controls was retained:  
•  GDP per capita 
•  Poverty gap
23 
•  Population size 
•  Population density 
•  Fuel exports to GDP
24 
•  An offshore dummy (i.e., whether the country was defined by the IMF as an 
offshore center in 2007) 
 
In view of the high correlation between income and poverty, the poverty gap was first 
regressed against per capita income. The residual of this regression was then substituted 
for the poverty variable. We also included an interacted term between country income 
level (GDP per capita) and country size (population). Except for the interacted term, all 
variables are expressed in logs, reflecting broadly constant elasticities.
25 We test a pooled 
OLS model, which for reasons of data availability, we restrict to the period 2000-05. The 
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Where   is the FDI for country i at time t. The benchmark indicator is the residual. The 
regionally adjusted benchmark is obtained by adding regional dummies.
it Y
26 
                                                 
23 This variable measures the proportion of the population under the poverty line, times the average 
distance from the poverty line. A value of zero was adopted for all high income countries (Source: Povcal 
Net, WorldBank) 
24 The alternative of using a broader index that included all mining exports was also explored but the fit 
was found to be inferior, suggesting that the impact of oil exports on financial development is sector 
specific.  
25 As a robustness check, we also estimated, for those indicators for which we have sufficient data, an 
alternative model based on the transformation of all variables into 25 quintiles and taking the inverse 
normal distribution to make the new variable normal. Results (see Appendix Table 1) are very close to 
those obtained with our standard specification. 
26 We dealt with the outliers using an iterative algorithm that gradually eliminates outliers within the one-
percent tails. 








































Log assets of 
pension 
funds
Log private credit to GDP 1.00
Log total private credit to GDP 0.97 1.00
Log deposits to GDP 0.85 0.84 1.00
Log total bank assets to GDP 0.94 0.92 0.89 1.00
Log net-interest margin -0.68 -0.67 -0.71 -0.69 1.00
Log interest spread -0.64 -0.64 -0.57 -0.64 0.68 1.00
Log bank overhead to total assets -0.55 -0.55 -0.61 -0.58 0.77 0.55 1.00
Log ATMs per 100,000 people 0.71 0.72 0.59 0.71 -0.47 -0.44 -0.21 1.00
Log deposits per 1,000 people 0.68 0.68 0.60 0.65 -0.57 -0.41 -0.35 0.75 1.00
Log bank branches per 100,000 people 0.74 0.73 0.61 0.72 -0.54 -0.43 -0.21 0.78 0.78 1.00
Log assets of mutual funds 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.71 -0.64 -0.43 -0.46 0.67 0.60 0.69 1.00
Log assets of insurance companies 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.77 -0.61 -0.52 -0.34 0.63 0.57 0.63 0.78 1.00
Log assets of pension funds 0.51 0.54 0.40 0.47 -0.31 -0.33 -0.18 0.37 0.19 0.31 0.35 0.47 1.00
Log assets of institutional investors 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.77 -0.65 -0.48 -0.45 0.65 0.53 0.64 0.84 0.84 0.70  
 
Table 3: Raw correlations between market indicators 
Log stock market 
capitalization to 
GDP
Log stock market 
value traded
Log listed firms 
per mln. 
inhabitants
Log market cap. 
of 10 largest 
firms
Log of closely 
held shares
Log total public 
offerings to GDP
Log stock price 
synchronicity






Log new private 
bonds to GDP
Log public bonds 
to GDP
Log public bonds 
tur nov er  to GDP
Log stock market capitalization to GDP 1.00
Log stock market value traded 0.78 1.00
Log listed firms per mln. inhabitants 0.50 0.40 1.00
Log market cap. of 10 largest firms -0.15 -0.25 -0.14 1.00
Log of closely held shares -0.44 -0.49 -0.45 0.28 1.00
Log total public offerings to GDP 0.37 0.13 0.35 -0.04 -0.14 1.00
Log stock price synchronicity 0.09 0.22 -0.19 -0.13 0.33 -0.17 1.00
Log stock market turnover 0.30 0.83 0.16 -0.25 -0.15 -0.09 0.24 1.00
Log private bonds to GDP 0.47 0.46 0.53 -0.34 -0.41 0.02 -0.17 0.25 1.00
Log private bonds turnover -0.18 0.15 -0.13 0.07 0.09 -0.26 0.16 0.33 -0.21 1.00
Log new private bonds to GDP 0.28 -0.01 0.30 0.17 -0.31 0.46 -0.31 -0.21 0.15 -0.27 1.00
Log public bonds to GDP 0.29 0.19 0.27 -0.12 -0.25 -0.05 0.01 0.05 0.41 -0.05 0.11 1.00
Log public bonds turnover to GDP -0.05 0.18 0.00 -0.19 -0.34 -0.25 0.32 0.34 0.21 0.44 0.25 0.06 1.00
5-percent significance levels in bold  
  15c. Correlations of the residuals 
The correlations of the residuals are reported in Table 4.
27 Notice first that while they are 
now much lower than for the raw indicators, correlations remain quite substantial in most 
cases. This suggests that performance is to a large extent systemic. Good performance in 
one sector goes together with good performance in another. This in turn may reflect the 
fact that good financial sector policies cut across all aspects of financial activity (e.g., 
there is a substantial underlying common policy component), or else, that good 
performance in one area is necessary for good performance in another.  
 
More specifically, the following correlations are particularly noteworthy: 
•  Bank size indicators are highly (and positively) correlated among themselves and 
substantially (albeit to a lower extent) negatively correlated with efficiency. That 
larger deposits lead to larger credit and better efficiency enhances intermediation 
is hardly surprising. Interestingly, however, deposits are more responsive to bank 
efficiency than credit. 
•  Remarkably, bank size and bank reach exhibit positive but much lower 
correlations, suggesting that reach and size are different dimensions following 
their own dynamics. At the same time, the ATM indicator exhibits a substantially 
positive correlation with the (in)efficiency indicator, suggesting that higher reach 
comes at a price (a similar result is obtained for bank branches). 
•  Institutional investors’ assets are highly correlated with the size of banks, equity 
markets and private bond markets, suggesting that institutional investors need 
well developed banks and markets for private instruments in order to thrive.   
Remarkably, on the other hand, the correlations with equity turnover and public 
bonds are negative. The former is consistent with the fact that institutional 
investors tend to buy and hold. The latter may reflect the fact countries with larger 
fiscal imbalances (hence a higher public debt) have a harder time developing 
private financial intermediaries, perhaps in part because in these countries the 
state plays a more important direct role in providing pensions or insurance. 
•  The otherwise very low correlations between the size of public bond markets and 
other financial indicators is consistent with the fact that the issue of public bonds 
is largely determined by fiscal policy, rather than financial sector policy. Hence, it 
is largely orthogonal to other financial indicators. Interestingly, however, the 
correlation between public debt and bank deposits is positive, suggesting the 
existence of some demand-pull effect.     
•  While banking and stock market size indicators are positively and significantly 
correlated with each other, private bond market size is positively and significantly 
correlated only with private credit, but insignificantly (albeit positively) with the 
stock market indicators. This suggests that private bonds substitute for private 
                                                 
27 To economize on space, we report only the ten core indicators. 
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credit but not for equity, which is consistent with a functional view of 
intermediation in which what matters is the type of instrument (debt versus 
shares) rather than the channel of intermediation (banks versus markets).
28 
•  Finally, the low correlation between equity turnover and all other core financial 
indicators (except for listed firms) is quite remarkable. It supports the view that 
equity market size does not necessarily breed liquidity. Moreover, the policies 
that may help an equity market become more liquid are not directly related to 
other financial sector policies. This, in turn, suggests that there are probably no 
easy, fail-proof ways to address this issue. 
d. Regression results 
Regression results for the non-regionally adjusted indicators appear in Tables 5a-d 
(basic descriptive statistics are reported in Table 6). Main highlights in terms of the 
significance of each of the controls are as follows: 
•  With minor exceptions as regards bonds’ turnover and new issues, GDP per 
capita is always positive and highly significant, confirming that the process of 
financial development closely accompanies that of economic development. 
Ordering all size-oriented FDIs according to their “income elasticity” produces 
an interesting ranking (see Table 7), linked with the degree of sophistication of 
the underlying market and the order with which it develops as the economy 
matures. Thus, public bonds “precede” bank deposits which, in turn, precede 
bank credit. All bank size indicators precede equity market development which 
in turn precedes private bond market development. Pension funds precede 
insurance companies, which in turn, precede mutual funds. The low elasticities 
of public bonds and pension funds perhaps reflect the fact that they are mostly 
policy driven (in that sense they may have a particularly important role to play as 
“precursors” of financial development).
29   
 
28 The non substitutability of debt and shares, which disproves the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem, 
is of course consistent with the fact that firm leverage is well predictable and consistent across countries. 
See for example Hart (2001) for a good theoretical review of underlying issues.   
29 A recent paper by Perotti and Schwienbacher (2007) argues that wealth redistribution due to inflation 
shock in the early half of the 20
th century can explain why some countries adopted a pay-as-you-go public 



























of listed firms 
per mln. 
inhabitants
Log private credit to GDP 1.00
Log deposits to GDP 0.85 1.00
Log net-interest margin -0.68 -0.71 1.00
Log ATMs per 100,000 people 0.71 0.59 -0.47 1.00
Log private bonds to GDP 0.66 0.55 -0.49 0.69 1.00
Log public bonds to GDP 0.29 0.40 -0.33 0.43 0.41 1.00
Log assets of institutional investors 0.78 0.76 -0.65 0.65 0.78 0.15 1.00
Log stock market capitalization to GDP 0.61 0.63 -0.45 0.58 0.47 0.29 0.70 1.00
Log number of listed firms per mln. inhabitants 0 . 5 10 . 5 2- 0 . 4 4 0 . 5 40 . 5 30 . 2 70 . 4 60 . 5 01 . 0 0

























of listed firms 
per mln. 
inhabitants
Log private credit to GDP 1.00
Log deposits to GDP 0.69 1.00
Log net-interest margin -0.40 -0.48 1.00
Log ATMs per 100,000 people 0.21 0.19 0.21 1.00
Log private bonds to GDP 0.32 0.19 -0.19 0.11 1.00
Log public bonds to GDP 0.00 0.17 -0.14 0.20 0.10 1.00
Log assets of institutional investors 0.45 0.50 -0.29 -0.04 0.30 -0.24 1.00
Log stock market capitalization to GDP 0.36 0.41 -0.19 0.10 0.20 0.16 0.49 1.00
Log number of listed firms per mln. inhabitants 0 . 1 60 . 2 1- 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 00 . 1 40 . 0 80 . 0 20 . 3 41 . 0 0
Log stock market turnover 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.15 -0.17 0.12 0.20  
  18Table 5-a: Bank Regression Results (2000-2006) 





























Log GDP per capita 0.487 0.48 0.35 0.441 -0.25 -0.239 -0.17 1.016 0.787 0.708
[0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.065]*** [0.113]*** [0.051]***
Offshore 0.259 0.274 0.454 0.375 -0.014 -0.316 -0.144 0.141 0.388 0.52
[0.085]*** [0.087]*** [0.069]*** [0.074]*** [0.063] [0.059]*** [0.075]* [0.509] [0.784] [0.376]
Log fuel -0.049 -0.044 -0.047 -0.017 0.012 0.002 -0.013 0.061 -0.027 -0.064
[0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]** [0.008] [0.006] [0.010] [0.048] [0.075] [0.038]*
Log poverty gap -0.054 -0.078 -0.047 -0.023 0.099 0.094 0.078 0.09 -0.286 -0.165
[0.029]* [0.030]*** [0.023]** [0.025] [0.021]*** [0.020]*** [0.024]*** [0.118] [0.154]* [0.095]*
Log population density 0.088 0.08 0.146 0.106 -0.077 -0.042 -0.079 -0.043 0.059 0.066
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.056] [0.079] [0.046]
Log population size 0.028 0.017 -0.006 0.046 -0.006 -0.08 -0.013 -0.061 0.067 0.04
[0.012]** [0.013] [0.010] [0.011]*** [0.009] [0.009]*** [0.011] [0.058] [0.094] [0.046]
GDP per capita * -0.006 0.004 0 -0.006 0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.066 -0.008
population size [0.002]*** [0.002]* [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.002]** [0.003] [0.002] [0.007] [0.057] [0.006]
Year-fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 986 985 981 984 984 815 993 88 54 97
Adjusted R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.5 0.48 0.3 0.8 0.61 0.71
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 





















Log GDP per capita 0.565 1.311 0.548 0.02 -0.099 0.36 0.047 0.689
[0.027]*** [0.045]*** [0.029]*** [0.011]* [0.028]*** [0.117]*** [0.024]** [0.034]***
Offshore 0.694 0.272 0.572 -0.468 -0.481 0.613 0.389 -0.208
[0.206]*** [0.338] [0.185]*** [0.081]*** [0.148]*** [0.550] [0.134]*** [0.226]
Log fuel 0.003 -0.097 -0.072 -0.003 0.075 0.169 -0.027 -0.075
[0.022] [0.038]** [0.024]*** [0.012] [0.031]** [0.088]* [0.029] [0.028]***
Log poverty gap 0.165 -0.507 -0.4 0.077 -0.159 0.271 -0.193 -0.52
[0.053]*** [0.088]*** [0.056]*** [0.023]*** [0.072]** [0.305] [0.053]*** [0.066]***
Log population density 0.121 0.155 0.105 -0.016 0.049 0.158 0.084 0.062
[0.022]*** [0.037]*** [0.024]*** [0.009]* [0.015]*** [0.049]*** [0.016]*** [0.028]**
Log population size 0.138 0.696 -0.327 -0.016 0.071 0.038 0.15 0.535
[0.023]*** [0.039]*** [0.024]*** [0.010] [0.024]*** [0.075] [0.021]*** [0.029]***
GDP per capita * -0.004 -0.017 0.007 -0.017 -0.015 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012
population size [0.004] [0.006]*** [0.004]* [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.007] [0.002]*** [0.005]***
Year-fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 665 670 704 362 264 282 292 676
Adjusted R-squared 0.5 0.64 0.6 0.49 0.47 0.15 0.34 0.53
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  




 Table 5-c: Bond Market Regression Results (2000-2006) 
















Log GDP per capita 1.2 0.192 0.168 0.197 -0.469
[0.074]*** [0.367] [0.239] [0.044]*** [0.586]
Offshore 2.424 -1.122 -0.44 0.492 -5.805
[0.372]*** [1.223] [0.980] [0.228]** [3.353]*
Log fuel -0.353 -0.071 0.149 -0.184 0.121
[0.070]*** [0.403] [0.174] [0.039]*** [0.770]
Log poverty gap -0.932 0.953 2.228 -0.137 -0.579
[0.228]*** [0.968] [0.560]*** [0.127] [1.021]
Log population density -0.066 -0.156 -0.003 0.133 -0.461
[0.032]** [0.219] [0.100] [0.022]*** [0.300]
Log population size 0.168 0.084 -0.263 0.047 -0.534
[0.058]*** [0.224] [0.141]* [0.032] [0.476]
GDP per capita * -0.002 -0.032 0.024 0.001 0.196
population size [0.005] [0.018]* [0.014] [0.003] [0.138]
Year-fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 242 55 173 280 52
A d j u s t e d  R - s q u a r e d 0 . 7 20 . 0 70 . 2 40 . 2 80
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Table 5-d: Institutional Investors Regression Results (2000-2006) 















Log GDP per capita 0.876 0.671 0.453 0.774
[0.073]*** [0.061]*** [0.101]*** [0.073]***
Offshore -1.204 0.437 0.214 0.196
[0.653]* [0.553] [0.927] [0.659]
Log fuel -0.16 -0.131 -0.129 -0.171
[0.059]*** [0.051]** [0.083] [0.059]***
Log poverty gap 0.055 0.291 0.23 0.171
[0.134] [0.115]** [0.190] [0.135]
Log population density 0.03 0.146 -0.163 -0.006
[0.066] [0.057]** [0.091]* [0.065]
Log population size 0.232 0.054 0.05 0.054
[0.070]*** [0.060] [0.096] [0.069]
GDP per capita * -0.006 0.001 0.008 0.002
population size [0.009] [0.008] [0.013] [0.009]
Year-fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 99 98 100 99
Adjusted R-squared 0.64 0.63 0.2 0.58
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Residuals 
 






of obs. per 
country
Log private credit to GDP 1.44 -1.61 0.00 0.59 0.31 0.18 0.59 155 986 6.36
Log total private credit to GDP 1.39 -1.67 0.00 0.60 0.30 0.18 0.60 155 985 6.35
Log deposits to GDP 1.33 -1.31 0.00 0.47 0.24 0.12 0.48 155 981 6.33
Log total bank assets to GDP 1.44 -1.50 0.00 0.51 0.29 0.15 0.51 154 984 6.39
Log net-interest margin 1.17 -1.09 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.17 0.40 158 984 6.23
Log interest spread 1.29 -1.21 0.00 0.42 0.50 0.19 0.39 150 815 5.43
Log bank overhead to total assets 1.36 -1.43 0.00 0.52 0.44 0.21 0.48 157 993 6.32
Log ATMs per 100,000 people 1.56 -1.67 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.68 88 88 1.00
Log of synthetic access 0.87 -1.05 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.37 157 157 1.00
Log deposits per 1,000 people 1.49 -1.77 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.71 54 54 1.00
Log number of bank branches per 100,000 people 1.39 -1.36 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.60 97 97 1.00
Log stock market capitalization to GDP 2.29 -2.63 0.00 0.85 0.32 0.28 0.87 109 665 6.10
Log stock market value traded 3.93 -4.22 0.00 1.43 0.49 0.67 1.37 111 670 6.04
Log number of listed firms per mln. inhabitants 2.72 -2.63 0.00 0.93 0.37 0.35 0.93 117 704 6.02
Log market cap. of 10 largest firms 0.42 -0.72 0.00 0.24 0.36 0.09 0.24 76 362 4.76
Log of closely held shares 0.76 -1.17 0.00 0.38 0.33 0.13 0.39 49 264 5.39
Log total public offerings to GDP 2.46 -4.66 0.00 1.33 0.75 0.83 1.11 45 282 6.27
Log stock price synchronicity 1.04 -1.09 0.00 0.39 0.96 0.27 0.28 61 292 4.79
Log stock market turnover 3.10 -3.02 0.00 1.06 0.59 0.57 0.97 112 676 6.04
Log private bonds to GDP 1.75 -2.41 0.00 0.79 0.23 0.19 0.82 41 242 5.90
Log private bonds turnover 2.72 -5.31 0.00 1.73 0.68 0.99 1.46 31 55 1.77
Log value new, dom. private bonds to GDP 4.69 -6.10 0.00 1.86 0.59 1.02 1.74 38 173 4.55
Log public bonds to GDP 1.19 -1.64 0.00 0.50 0.35 0.18 0.53 48 280 5.83
Log public bonds turnover 3.75 -7.15 0.00 2.83 0.17 0.49 2.93 31 52 1.68
Long minus short government yield 7.56 -11.43 0.00 2.19 0.81 1.50 1.86 45 224 4.98
Log assets of mutual funds 2.24 -1.72 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.88 99 99 1.00
Log assets of insurance companies 2.01 -1.90 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.74 98 98 1.00
Log assets of pension funds 2.67 -2.86 0.00 1.25 0.00 0.00 1.25 100 100 1.00
Log assets of institutional investors 2.14 -1.83 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.89 99 99 1.00
  22•  Return to scale effects, as proxied by population size, are present in some, albeit 
not all, banking indicators. They affect credit and total assets but not deposits, 
bank spreads but not interest margins or overheads. However, they strongly affect 
mutual funds’ assets and nearly all equity market indicators. This overwhelming 
evidence of strong returns to scale effects as regards capital markets and some of 
the more developed financial institutions that feed them is consistent with the 
observation often found in the literature that capital markets have a much harder 
time to develop and attain critical mass in the smaller countries.
30 
 
•  The interaction of income and size is highly significant for those indicators that 
exhibit scale effects, including bank credit, bank efficiency, and equity market 
liquidity (turnover), with a sign indicating a dampening effect. Thus, while both 
income and size affect important dimensions of financial development, 
particularly efficiency and liquidity, their impact is not fully cumulative. The fact 
that the interacted terms is in natural magnitudes rather than logs, as the rest of the 
model, suggests strong nonlinearities at the higher end of the scale, i.e., when both 
income level and size are large. Natural limits to efficiency gains seem to be 
eventually reached past some threshold level. 
•  Population density also has a remarkably important and consistent impact on 
many (albeit not all) aspects of financial development. It clearly promotes the size 
of both banks and institutional investors, and raises bank efficiency. Surprisingly, 
however, it does not seem to affect bank reach. It also has an important impact on 
the equity market, both as regards the size of primary issues and secondary market 
activity (as determined by value traded and turnover). Interestingly, it affects 
public bond capitalization but not private bonds.  
•  The poverty gap is also highly significant for many bank and capital markets size 
and efficiency indicators, with a sign that is consistent with poverty dampening 
financial development or, alternatively, financial development reducing poverty. 
According to the first interpretation, a higher poverty gap limits the size of the 
financial system, thereby also constraining its efficiency.
31 While this effect could 
reflect barriers to access, it is surprising, however, that the impact of poverty on 
access, as determined by the number of bank branches and bank deposits, is only 
mildly significant.
32 
                                                 
30 This matches earlier findings; see Bossone, Honohan and Long (2002). 
31 Poverty could also hinder financial development through higher political risk, hence higher risk premia. 
Further work is needed to sort out endogeneity issues and fully uncover these linkages. 
32 The lack of a clear linkage, which is consistent with earlier findings (see Honohan, 2006), may reflect the 
fact that existing bank indicators reflect bank density (i.e., the increased proximity of banking services for 
already connected customers) rather than bank reach (the increased availability of banking services to thus 
far marginalized customers). 
  23Table 7: Income Elasticities 
Variable Ranking  Income  elasticity 
Public Bonds  1  0.20 
Bank Deposits  2  0.35 
Bank Assets  3  0.44 
Pension Funds  4  0.45 
Bank Credit  5  0.49 
Stock Market Cap.  6  0.56 
Insurance Assets  7  0.66 
Inst. Inv. Assets  8  0.77 
Mutual Funds  9  0.88 
Private Bonds Cap.  10  1.20 
Value Traded  11  1.30 
 
•  Offshore effects are also very strong and consistent across the board. Offshore 
centers have larger (and, as a result, more efficient) banking systems (particularly 
as regards deposits). Their banking systems also have better reach. While their 
equity markets are larger in size (this is also true for bonds) and less concentrated, 
they are neither more liquid nor more efficient. 
•  Finally, oil-based economies have smaller financial institutions and smaller, less 
liquid, and more concentrated markets. This also agrees well with what one would 
expect. 
As regards quality of fit (as determined by the adjusted R-squared), main highlights are as 
follows: 
 
•  All bank size indicators and (surprisingly enough) all reach indicators have very 
good fit. Efficiency indicators are also reasonably good, except for operating 
expenses. 
•  In the case of institutional investors, the fit is quite good for insurance companies 
and mutual funds, but very poor for pension funds. As already noted, the latter is 
not that surprising given the importance of the policy component and its wide 
possible variance across countries.
33 However, it may also reflect in part poorer 
data quality. Interestingly, however, the fit of the sum of all three types of 
institutional investors is nearly as good as that of the top performer in the group 
(insurance companies), suggesting that pension funds can indeed be largely 
viewed as complements for other forms of long-term savings and collective 
investment vehicles. 
                                                 
33 The importance of private pension funds assets should reflect, among other things, whether there is a 
mandatory second pillar system (and, if so, the date at which it was introduced) and the size of 
contributions, which in turn depend on the existence and coverage of a first pillar, pay-as-you-go system.     
  24•  For the equities markets, value traded (and, surprisingly, listed companies) 
perform better than market cap, which tends to confirm the reluctance to use 
market cap. Yet, the latter has a reasonably high fit, the same as turnover. All 
other equity market indicators (including concentration, efficiency, and new 
offerings) have low fits. 
•  As regards the bond market, private bonds capitalization has a surprisingly good 
fit. However, the fit for other private bonds indicators and public bonds is much 
lower (the latter is again hardly surprising given the importance of policy). 
Results for the regionally adjusted specifications are reported in Appendix Tables 2a-d. 
With very minor exceptions, the coefficients of the structural control variables are not 
significantly altered, which shows that the results are robust. However, as summarized in 
Figure 2 and Appendix Table 3 for the ten core indicators, there are substantial regional 
effects: 
 
•  These are particularly evident in the case of size, with high income countries and 
countries in the far east (both in South Asia and in East Asia and the Pacific) 
having relatively larger financial markets than the rest of the world. Middle 
Eastern and Northern African countries also have larger than average banking 
systems (particularly as regards deposits), as well as larger public bond markets. 
Inversely, countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have substantially smaller 
financial systems perhaps reflecting their transition status.  
•  As regards efficiency and liquidity, high income and Asian countries’ financial 
systems are more efficient, which is consistent with being larger. Instead, Latin 
America lags behind substantially as regards both banking system and equity 
market efficiency, even though its financial systems are not much smaller. 
•  As regards reach, the Sub-Saharan region underperforms compared to the rest of 
the world, which is consistent with the more difficult challenges it faces in terms 
of access. However, the high income countries, the Middle East, and South Asia, 
which all have bigger banking systems, also underperform, while some regions 
with relatively less developed banking systems, such as the Latin American and 
transition countries, overperform. This suggests some substitution between cash-
based and bank-based activity. At the same time, it underlines some of the 
limitations of our core reach indicator. In addition to being technology dependent, 
it is also affected by the relative development of other banking indicators.  




































































































e. Principal components analysis 
 
Factor analysis was used to help order and sort out the indicator sets for institutions and 
markets (but only for equities).
34 For each sector a first analysis was conducted with all 
the pre-selected indicators for the sector. A second analysis was then run with the more 
limited number of indicators that have broader country coverage. Results appear in Table 
8 for institutions, and Table 9 for equities. A final analysis combines key banking and 
equity indicators (Table 10). Highlights are as follows: 
 
•  Starting with Table 8, three clearly distinct dimensions appear, ranked by order of 
importance: i) size; ii) efficiency; and iii) reach.
35 As regards size, total assets 
have the highest loading, credit the lowest, which is not surprising (some banking 
systems may be large but have a hard time to channel resources into loans). 
•  As regards efficiency, net interest margin has the highest loading while the spread 
has the lowest. Furthermore, the latter has a very high uniqueness factor, 
suggesting that spreads may be reflecting an altogether different dimension. 
Notice also that while size and efficiency exhibit clearly negative cross-
correlations, the size indicators do not show up in the reach dimension, suggesting 
that reach and size are largely orthogonal to each other.  
                                                 
34 Underlying dimensions are constructed by a weighting of indicators, the indicator that is more associated 
with the dimension receiving a higher weight (so-called factor loading). Conversely, every indicator can be 
thought of as being a weighted sum of the dimensions or factors. The factor loadings, are computed using 
the squared multiple correlations as estimates of the communality, the part of the variance of the indicator 
that is captured by the factors. To arrive at factor loadings that are more intuitively interpretable, we use the 
varimax technique which maximizes the squared loadings for each factor. 
35 The columns are place in the order of decreasing variability in the indicators. Hence, Size contains more 
information than Efficiency which contains more information than Reach. 
  26Table 8: Factor Analysis on Institutional Indicators (2000-2006) 
Number of observations: 36. Number of parameters: 27.
0.63 0.06 0.59 0.10 Log branches per 100,000 people
0.44 -0.14 0.73 0.14 Log deposits per 1,000 people
0.48 0.23 0.67 0.07 Log ATMs per 100,000 people
0.40 0.02 -0.05 0.77 Log assets of institutional assets to GDP
0.26 0.65 0.13 -0.54 Log overhead to total assets
0.76 0.48 -0.03 -0.09 Log interest spread
0.28 0.70 -0.02 -0.48 Log net interest margin
0.06 -0.19 0.07 0.95 Log total assets of deposit money banks to GDP
0.14 -0.28 0.08 0.88 Log deposits to GDP
0.19 -0.18 0.19 0.86 Log private credit via deposit money banks to GDP
Uniqueness Efficiency Reach Size Variable
Number of observations: 36. Number of parameters: 27.
0.63 0.06 0.59 0.10 Log branches per 100,000 people
0.44 -0.14 0.73 0.14 Log deposits per 1,000 people
0.48 0.23 0.67 0.07 Log ATMs per 100,000 people
0.40 0.02 -0.05 0.77 Log assets of institutional assets to GDP
0.26 0.65 0.13 -0.54 Log overhead to total assets
0.76 0.48 -0.03 -0.09 Log interest spread
0.28 0.70 -0.02 -0.48 Log net interest margin
0.06 -0.19 0.07 0.95 Log total assets of deposit money banks to GDP
0.14 -0.28 0.08 0.88 Log deposits to GDP
0.19 -0.18 0.19 0.86 Log private credit via deposit money banks to GDP
Uniqueness Efficiency Reach Size Variable
Number of observations: 113. Number of parameters: 11.
0.32 0.81 -0.16 Log overhead to total assets
0.71 0.50 -0.20 Log interest spread
0.30 0.80 -0.23 Log net interest margin
0.09 -0.15 0.94 Log total assets of deposit money banks to GDP
0.25 -0.21 0.84 Log deposits to GDP
0.27 -0.15 0.84 Log private credit via deposit money banks to GDP
Uniqueness Efficiency Size Variable
Number of observations: 113. Number of parameters: 11.
0.32 0.81 -0.16 Log overhead to total assets
0.71 0.50 -0.20 Log interest spread
0.30 0.80 -0.23 Log net interest margin
0.09 -0.15 0.94 Log total assets of deposit money banks to GDP
0.25 -0.21 0.84 Log deposits to GDP
0.27 -0.15 0.84 Log private credit via deposit money banks to GDP
Uniqueness Efficiency Size Variable
 
•  As regards reach, the deposit account indicator has the highest loading, branches 
the lowest. While this would argue in principle in favor of deposits, notice that all 
three have high uniqueness factors, suggesting the presence of substantial 
“unexplained” components. Notice also the significant positive loading of ATMs 
per capita in the efficiency column, reflecting again the cost of providing access.  
•  Going now to Table 9, the size and liquidity dimensions appear clearly, with 
market cap being the main size indicator and turnover the main liquidity indicator. 
Interestingly, market cap is unrelated to liquidity. Not surprisingly, value traded is 
instead the main bridge between size and liquidity (turnover being the key 
liquidity indicator). 
•  The third dimension in the equity market PCA analysis yields a somewhat blurred 
picture. It brings together measures of efficiency (as determined by price 
synchronicity), reach (as determined by market concentration), and size (as 
determined by new issues). As would be expected, a higher price synchronicity 
(less efficiency) is related to smaller size (less issues) and a higher share of 
closely held shares. However, less efficient markets also appear to be less 
concentrated in terms of the top ten capitalization share, which is somewhat 
  27counterintuitive.
36 In any event, all these indicators have a high degree of 
uniqueness, suggesting that there is more than meets the eye, or else that quality 
or coverage leaves to be desired. 
 
Table 9: Factor Analysis on Stock Market Indicators (2000-06) 
Number of observations: 111. Number of parameters: 6.
0.05 0.02 0.98 Log turnover
0.87 0.22 0.29 Log number of listed firms
0.02 0.64 0.76 Log value traded
0.06 0.97 0.07 Log stock market capitalization
Uniqueness Size Liquidity Variable
Number of observations: 111. Number of parameters: 6.
0.05 0.02 0.98 Log turnover
0.87 0.22 0.29 Log number of listed firms
0.02 0.64 0.76 Log value traded
0.06 0.97 0.07 Log stock market capitalization
Uniqueness Size Liquidity Variable
Number of observations: 40. Number of parameters: 21.
0.01 0.00 -0.05 1.00 Log turnover
0.79 0.46 0.02 0.00 Log stock price synchronicity
0.67 -0.33 0.45 -0.13 Log total public offerings to GDP
0.72 0.30 -0.12 -0.41 Log of closely held shares
0.73 -0.35 -0.37 -0.12 Log market capitalization of 10 largest firms
0.48 -0.06 0.66 0.29 Log number of listed firms
0.03 0.02 0.53 0.83 Log value traded
0.12 0.02 0.94 0.10 Log stock market capitalization
Uniqueness Efficiency  Size Liquidity Variable
Number of observations: 40. Number of parameters: 21.
0.01 0.00 -0.05 1.00 Log turnover
0.79 0.46 0.02 0.00 Log stock price synchronicity
0.67 -0.33 0.45 -0.13 Log total public offerings to GDP
0.72 0.30 -0.12 -0.41 Log of closely held shares
0.73 -0.35 -0.37 -0.12 Log market capitalization of 10 largest firms
0.48 -0.06 0.66 0.29 Log number of listed firms
0.03 0.02 0.53 0.83 Log value traded
0.12 0.02 0.94 0.10 Log stock market capitalization
Uniqueness Efficiency  Size Liquidity Variable
 
•  The number of listed firms is most highly related to the size dimension. However, 
it has a high uniqueness factor (this is particularly evident in the second analysis 
with broader coverage but less indicators), which suggests that it accounts for an 
altogether distinct dimension. 
•  Table 10 confirms the main conclusions above on a cross-sector basis. Four clear 
dimensions appear (bank reach variables were not included): i) bank size; ii) stock 
market liquidity; iii) bank efficiency; and iv) stock market size. Listed firms pops 
up as a largely unexplained variable (the same as bank spreads), confirming that it 
captures an additional dimension which we will label as reach. Interestingly 
enough, stock market size (i.e., market cap) ranks last by order of importance, 
confirming the need to look at other equity indicators besides market cap in order 
to assess market development. 
 
                                                 
36 The somewhat conflicting story in terms of market concentration may be linked to estimation problems.  
In a scatter diagram analysis of predicted versus actual values, the indicators of equity market concentration 
appear to bifurcate (they are the only indicators among our list of 27 for which this occurs).  
  28Table 10: Factor Analysis on Banks and Equity Markets (2000-2006) 
High Low
Number of observations: 87. Number of parameters: 34.
0.32 -0.09 0.70 -0.20 -0.37 Log overhead to total assets
0.63 -0.09 0.59 -0.11 -0.07 Log interest spread
0.34 0.00 0.71 -0.13 -0.37 Log net interest margin
0.07 0.20 -0.10 0.05 0.94
Log total assets of deposit money banks to 
GDP
0.17 0.23 -0.21 -0.08 0.86 Log deposits to GDP
0.12 0.15 -0.22 0.10 0.89
Log private credit via deposit money banks 
to GDP
0.03 0.01 -0.12 0.98 -0.04 Log turnover
0.78 0.10 -0.01 0.38 0.25 Log number of listed firms
0.01 0.59 -0.09 0.78 0.15 Log value traded
0.04 0.91 -0.04 0.14 0.33 Log stock market capitalization
Uniqueness Stocks/Size Banking/Efficiency Stocks/Liquidity Banking/Size Variable
Number of observations: 87. Number of parameters: 34.
0.32 -0.09 0.70 -0.20 -0.37 Log overhead to total assets
0.63 -0.09 0.59 -0.11 -0.07 Log interest spread
0.34 0.00 0.71 -0.13 -0.37 Log net interest margin
0.07 0.20 -0.10 0.05 0.94
Log total assets of deposit money banks to 
GDP
0.17 0.23 -0.21 -0.08 0.86 Log deposits to GDP
0.12 0.15 -0.22 0.10 0.89
Log private credit via deposit money banks 
to GDP
0.03 0.01 -0.12 0.98 -0.04 Log turnover
0.78 0.10 -0.01 0.38 0.25 Log number of listed firms
0.01 0.59 -0.09 0.78 0.15 Log value traded
0.04 0.91 -0.04 0.14 0.33 Log stock market capitalization
Uniqueness Stocks/Size Banking/Efficiency Stocks/Liquidity Banking/Size Variable
 
f. Core indicators 
 
Table 11 provides a synopsis of relevant criteria (described in the previous section) for 
narrowing our core set of indicators. Main steps followed in the selection process were as 
follows: 
 
•  As regards bank size indicators, they rank very similarly as regards all criteria 
except that of linking up with final welfare objectives (where credit variables are 
better) and coverage (total claims on the private sector has a much lower 
coverage). Hence, narrow credit is a clear winner on account of both coverage 
and welfare linkages.  
•  In addition to narrow credit, however, we also retained deposits in our core list on 
account of the fact that attracting and placing funds can have different dynamics, 
particularly in incipient systems or in systems that are undergoing systemic stress. 
•  As regards bank efficiency, the net interest margin dominates operating costs on 
account of its goodness of fit and the spread on account of its higher factor 
loading and lower year-to-year variability. The fact that its definition (and 
construction) is clearer than that of bank spreads (where there are some questions 
as regards the consistency with which rates are being picked across countries and 
time periods) is an important further argument in favor of net interest margins. 
•  As regards bank reach, the number of deposit accounts dominates the other two 
indicators as regards factor loadings and its more limited dependence on 
idiosyncratic and perhaps rapidly evolving technological factors. It would 
naturally be the indicator of choice, except for the fact that its coverage is 
severely more limited (its goodness of fit is also a bit lower, which might suggest 
  29lower data quality). On the other hand, ATMs per capita slightly dominates bank 
branches per capita on account of a better fit and somewhat lower uniqueness 
factors in the principal components analysis. Hence, until better information is 
collected, we picked ATMs per capita as our choice reach indicator for banks. 
 














BANKS SIZE Log private credit via deposit money banks to GDP DIRECT HIGH HIGH EXCELLENT HIGH YES
Log total private credit to GDP DIRECT HIGH HIGH POOR HIGH NO
Log deposits to GDP INDIRECT HIGH HIGH EXCELLENT HIGH YES
Log total assets of deposit money banks to GDP INDIRECT HIGH HIGH GOOD  HIGH NO
EFFICIENCY Log net interest margin INDIRECT MEDIUM HIGH GOOD  HIGH YES
Log interest spread INDIRECT MEDIUM MEDIUM GOOD  LOW NO
Log overhead to total assets INDIRECT LOW HIGH GOOD  HIGH NO
REACH Log ATMs per 100,000 people INDIRECT HIGH MEDIUM LOW NA YES
Log deposits per 1,000 people INDIRECT HIGH HIGH LOW NA NO
Log branches per 100,000 people INDIRECT HIGH LOW LOW NA NO
INST. INVESTORS SIZE Log assets of institutional assets to GDP INDIRECT MEDIUM - LOW NA YES
Log assets of pension funds to GDP INDIRECT LOW - LOW NA NO
Log assets of insurance companies to GDP INDIRECT HIGH - LOW NA NO
Log assets to mutual funds to GDP INDIRECT HIGH - LOW NA NO
STOCK MARKETS SIZE Log stock market capitalization INDIRECT MEDIUM HIGH GOOD HIGH YES
Log number of listed firms INDIRECT HIGH MEDIUM GOOD  HIGH YES
LIQUIDITY Log turnover DIRECT MEDIUM HIGH GOOD  MEDIUM YES
Log value traded INDIRECT HIGH LOW GOOD  HIGH NO
REACH Log market capitalization of 10 largest firms INDIRECT MEDIUM MEDIUM LOW HIGH NO
Log of closely held shares INDIRECT MEDIUM MEDIUM LOW HIGH NO
Log total public offerings to GDP INDIRECT LOW MEDIUM LOW HIGH NO
Log stock price synchronicity INDIRECT LOW MEDIUM LOW HIGH NO
BOND MARKETS SIZE Log private bonds to GDP INDIRECT HIGH - LOW HIGH YES
Log public bonds to GDP INDIRECT LOW - LOW HIGH YES
EFFICIENCY Log turnover domestic private bonds INDIRECT LOW - LOW HIGH NO
Log turnover domestic public bonds INDIRECT LOW - LOW LOW NO
REACH Log value new issues domestic private bonds to GDP INDIRECT LOW - LOW LOW NO  
 
•  As regards institutional investors, total assets in the sector is a clear winner on 
account of the fact that it incorporates information on pension funds that 
otherwise would be lost due to the fact that the pension fund assets on their own 
are basically “all over the place”, reflecting the great variety of institutional 
arrangements and dates of introduction. However, the good fit of insurance 
companies and mutual funds suggests that a breakdown by sub-sectors would also 
serve a useful purpose.
37   
•  As regards the equity market size indicators, we picked market capitalization over 
value traded notwithstanding the former’s lackluster performance in terms of fit 
and linkages with welfare objectives. The higher factor loadings of market cap as 
regards size and the high correlation between value traded and turnover suggests 
that market cap provides more additional value in terms of understanding the level 
of development of the equity market than value traded, which basically replicates 
the information already provided in turnover.  
                                                 
37 For this reason, although we do not include these indicators in the core set, we report their values 
separately in the benchmarks template. 
  30•  Turnover, on the other hand, is a clear winner as regards market liquidity on 
account of its high factor loading and coverage. 
•  As regards equity market reach, we retained the number of listed firms over the 
two market concentration indicators on account of a much better coverage, much 
better fit, and lower intra-country variance, which all suggest that the 
concentration indicators, while possibly important, are harder to pin down and 
require more effort to broaden their coverage. 
•  Finally, as regards the bond markets, private bonds capitalization and public 
bonds capitalization emerge as natural choices, one on account of its goodness of 
fit and the other on account of the fact that, while more difficult to benchmark 
given the variety of policy choices, public bonds markets are a key underlying 
component of financial market development.  
g. Variance decomposition 
 
The relative importance of our set of controls in explaining cross-country differences is 
summarized in Appendix Table 4 and Figure 3, based on a variance decomposition of 
each of the core indicators.
38 It shows that: 
 
•  Per capita income (i.e., economic development) accounts for the lion’s share of 
cross-country differences. 
 
•  Scale effects are only important as regards equity market development. 
 
•  Density plays an important role as regards the collection of deposits and, 
remarkably enough, the sale of public bonds. 
 
•  Consistent with expectations, public bond issues are smaller in oil exporting 
countries, as governments have less need for financing.  
 
•  Other explanatory variables (the offshore dummy, poverty, and the interaction 
between income and size) do not play an important role overall (they still can 
play an essential role for specific countries, however).  
 
•  The share explained by the residual is quite sizable in all cases, except for ATMs, 
which suggests that policy has an important role to play.
39 
                                                 
38 The following identity is used:  ) , ( ) , var( ε β Y Cov X Y Co VarY i i + =∑  where Y is a dependent 
variable linearly estimated over a set of independent variables Xi with regression coefficients  i β  and a 
residual ε . 
39  Part of the residuals could also of course be non-policy related, reflecting measurement errors or 
important remaining structural determinants unaccounted for in our controls. However, as already stressed, 
the fact that correlations across indicators are generally substantial would argue against interpreting the 
residuals entirely as measurement error. While missing structural factors cannot be of course ruled out 
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h. Dynamic analysis  
 
For the indicators for which long series are available (mainly bank and equity market size 
and efficiency), it is possible to estimate structural regressions based on a panel with time 
varying coefficients. These allow for a deeper look into the more distant past, thereby 
providing a fuller perspective on historical trends and bumps along the way (results are 
shown in Appendix Table 5). The evolution through time of the income elasticities 
appears in Figure 4.  
 
•  Except for equity market capitalization, changes over time, while statistically 
significant, are economically not very large. This suggests that the process of 
financial development, at least from a sufficiently aggregated perspective, is fairly 
stable and predictable. 
 
•  It is also very remarkable, however, that all elasticities (except for the net interest 
margin, because it is an inefficiency indicator) trend upwards, suggesting that 
economic development plays an increasingly crucial role over time in determining 
financial development.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
either, it seems also improbable that they could be sizable enough to account for more than a small fraction 
of the residuals. Moreover, as emphasized in Section II, the residuals share is likely to under-estimate the 
impact of policy, which is already captured by the per capita income and poverty terms. Ultimately, of 
course, interpreting benchmarks remains a matter of judgment and should be done with caution. 
Benchmarking is only meant to provide initial guidance, not final answers. 
 
  32•  In the case of market capitalization, the link with economic development was not 
initially significant, thus even low income countries could have large capital 
markets. However, this is no longer the case. 
 
 





































* Based on coefficients of pooled OLS regressions for the period 1980-2006 with the logarithm of X as a dependent variable. 
The independent variables include the logarithms of GDP per capita, population size and density, the value of fuel exports to GDP, 
the poverty gap, and a dummy that indicates whether the country is an offshore financial center or not 
(see http://www.imf.org/external/np/ofca/ofca.asp). To allow for time-varying coefficients of these indicators, 
two interactions are added for each of these indicators: 
one interaction with a time indicator (where 1980 is t=0) and another with the square of the time indicator. 
The time indicator and its square are also both included as independent variables on their own.  
 
 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
 
Important gaps in the currently available cross-country information on financial sector 
development will need to be filled: 
 
•  While information on banks is far more thorough than for other sectors (thanks in 
large part to the Fund’s IFS), it is nonetheless far from complete, even for very 
basic bank size indicators. In particular, as regards access and reach, efforts are 
also needed to collect more systematically data on accounts originating from the 
variety of non-bank institutions that cater more directly to the lower income 
groups (coops, savings and loans, postal banks, microfinance institutions, etc.).
40 
Further efforts are also needed to perfect the links between survey data on the 
percentage of households with access to a financial account and institutional data 
on the number of accounts.
41 Filling up this gap is particularly important in view 
                                                 
40 Christen et al. (2004) and Peachey and Roe (2006) have already made important contributions in this 
direction.  
41 Honohan (2006) provides a key first step in this direction. 
  33of the strong shortcomings of the ATM indicator, which has a very limited policy 
component and is dependent on both financial development and technology.  
 
•  As regards non-bank financial institutions, a substantial effort will be needed to 
put together a more comprehensive data set. For institutional investors, 
information on asset size is still quite dispersed and incomplete; on efficiency (for 
example fees) and reach (number of customers), it is essentially non-existent. On 
other non-bank financial institutions (factoring and leasing companies, finance 
companies, coops, housing finance, etc…), there is even less. Yet, some of these 
activities (for example factoring and leasing) can play a key role in helping 




•  Information on bond markets, another key component of financial development, is 
also severely deficient. While cross-country information on bond market size 
(public and private) has improved, mostly thanks to BIS efforts, country coverage 
remains limited. Information on secondary markets’ efficiency and liquidity (for 
example bid-ask spreads by transaction size) is even more deficient. Nor is there 
sufficient standardized information to assess the completeness and scope of the 
public bonds yield curve. Last but not least, current information does not break 
down private bonds by origin, corporate or housing. In this context, the lack of 
information on asset-backed securities is another key shortcoming which prevents 
assessing the growth of the securitization and structured products industry. 
 
•  The lack of information on risk-based instruments (except for insurance products 
on which the Swiss-Re database provides a wealth of information) is a final major 
gap in the existing financial information. In particular, there is very little 
information on derivative markets, a key component of financial development in 
middle-income countries. 
 
•  Last but certainly not least, in view of the ever more important impact of financial 
globalization, it is also crucial to incorporate information on financial transactions 
that originate offshore. This applies of course to banking but also, and 
increasingly so, to bond and equity markets. In many countries, the welfare 
impact of small domestic financial systems is offset by large offshore transactions. 
While much progress has already been made, mainly by BIS, in gathering 
information on offshore holdings by (and liabilities from) non-residents, more 
efforts are needed to collect this type of information, particularly as regards equity 
markets (ADRs and the like).      
 
                                                 
42 The Fund’s ongoing efforts to expand IFS data to include non-bank institutions could play a key role in 
this respect, provided it becomes available soon enough and can be broken down by sectors and functions.  
As the same activities can be developed by different institutions, the data should ideally be collected in a 
way that can be sorted out by functions (for example, factoring products offered by general purpose banks 
would need to be added to those offered by specialized institutions). Data on fees (particularly for mutual 
and pension funds) would also be highly desirable. 
  34More and better information will of course allow both to extend the scope of the analysis 
and to improve its quality. However, even with the currently available information, much 
more can be done to systematically enhance our understanding and assessment of 
financial development. The analysis can be pushed in at least three directions: i) 
deepening the analysis of FDIs to provide a more complete and thorough assessment; ii) 
linking FDIs to EEIs to better understand the policy transmission mechanism; and iii) 
linking FDIs to EDIs so as to improve the assessment of final impact.  
 
As regards the deepening of the analysis of FDIs, the following areas readily come to 
mind: 
 
•  In many cases, FDIs can be broken down and decomposed in revealing ways. Take 
for example the case of banks’ interest margins. Using basic accounting information, 
these can be broken down into operating costs, profit margins, taxation and reserve 
requirements, margins for asset provisioning, etc. Benchmarking each of these 
components can help identify key constraints and bottlenecks to banking efficiency.
43 
Once the information becomes available, similar decompositions could conceivably 
be carried out to analyze the efficiency of non-bank or capital market intermediaries.   
 
•  More generally, much more can be done to deepen the analysis and benchmarking of 
financial development (the analysis of core FDIs provided in this paper only scratches 
the surface). For example, one may wish to benchmark the development of more 
specific markets and instruments such as those related to housing or corporate finance. 
The analysis of key market development aspects, such as liquidity and efficiency, can 
also be furthered beyond that of simple turnover ratios. In the case of financial 
institutions, one would wish to review more specific aspects of competition and 
efficiency such as at the product level, rather than the overall market level. 
 
As regards linking FDIs to EEIs, the first step would be to expand the analysis and 
benchmarking of the enabling environment.
44 More efforts seem to be called for in 
analyzing more systematically the transmission from the enabling environment to 
financial development. For example, how soon should one expect progress in improving 
the macroeconomic, contractual, or informational frameworks to trickle down into an 
expansion of credit? Or how much improvement in access can be expected from relaxing 
some of the underlying key costs and constraints? A first step in this analysis would be to 
explain FDIs based on EEIs.  
 
Improving the benchmarking of the linkages between FDIs and EDIs would further help 
fill in the dots as regards the process of financial development. While important research 
has been produced in recent years to demonstrate the existence of these linkages, more 
                                                 
43 While important progress has already been made at the Bank in this direction, particularly in the context 
of FSAPs, these have been mostly isolated efforts. See Beck and Fuchs (2004) and Hauner and Peiris 
(2005). See Beck (2007) for a more general discussion. 
44 This is of course an area where the Bank has already achieved much progress, particularly as regards the 
Doing Business Indicators. Further progress in the financial area is already on the way with the pilot 
program on the Getting Finance Indicators. 
  35work would be needed to provide the detail required for benchmarking purposes. In 
particular, more could be done to locate a country’s financial development within the 
broader process of economic development. For this purpose, the leads and lags, 
sequencing and complementarities of sectors, instruments and markets need to be 
analyzed in greater detail. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table 1: Robust regression results (2000-2006)* 
* These are the usual pooled OLS regressions, except that all the variables (except Offshore) have been transformed. Th
transformation consists of breaking up the values into 25 quantiles and taking the inverse normal distribution of this unifor














Log GDP per capita 0.748 0.641 -0.585 0.707 0.601 0.613
[0.018]*** [0.017]*** [0.024]*** [0.031]*** [0.027]*** [0.031]***
Offshore 0.265 0.75 -0.119 0.71 0.483 -0.124
[0.075]*** [0.073]*** [0.094] [0.158]*** [0.113]*** [0.137]
Log fuel -0.177 -0.148 -0.004 0.05 -0.075 -0.053
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.025] [0.031] [0.026]*** [0.030]*
Log poverty -0.05 -0.08 0.126 0.076 -0.178 -0.22
[0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.024]*** [0.030]** [0.026]*** [0.030]***
Log population density 0.165 0.309 -0.221 0.176 0.109 0.116
[0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.024]*** [0.027]*** [0.024]*** [0.027]***
Log population  0.045 -0.018 0.039 0.202 -0.438 0.606
[0.022]** [0.022] [0.028] [0.033]*** [0.029]*** [0.033]***
Year-fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 987 978 988 674 706 681
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.7 0.48 0.49 0.6 0.5
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
 
  39Table 2-a: Regionally adjusted regression results for banks (2000-2006) 




























Log GDP per capita 0.471 0.491 0.4 0.46 -0.244 -0.25 -0.152 1.186 0.986 0.649
[0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.021]*** [0.023]*** [0.017]*** [0.020]*** [0.019]*** [0.119]*** [0.175]*** [0.098]***
Offshore 0.147 0.146 0.338 0.255 0.077 -0.285 -0.021 -0.399 -0.102 0.511
[0.082]* [0.082]* [0.065]*** [0.072]*** [0.055] [0.060]*** [0.061] [0.532] [0.916] [0.398]
Log fuel -0.043 -0.038 -0.046 -0.016 0.008 0.004 -0.016 -0.007 -0.026 -0.055
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]** [0.007] [0.006] [0.008]** [0.053] [0.082] [0.042]
Log poverty gap -0.145 -0.213 -0.071 -0.117 0.049 0.041 -0.018 -0.05 -0.23 0.062
[0.039]*** [0.039]*** [0.031]** [0.034]*** [0.026]* [0.032] [0.029] [0.199] [0.267] [0.153]
Log population density 0.082 0.074 0.149 0.108 -0.041 -0.041 -0.034 -0.028 0.065 0.032
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.057] [0.086] [0.049]
Log population size 0.015 0.007 -0.013 0.028 0.033 -0.078 0.032 -0.086 0.042 0.031
[0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.010]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.060] [0.106] [0.050]
GDP per capita * -0.006 0.004 0 -0.005 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.041 -0.008
population size [0.002]*** [0.002]* [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.001]** [0.003] [0.002] [0.007] [0.060] [0.006]
Region==EAP 0.172 0.285 0.428 0.275 -0.287 -0.157 -0.481 1.199 1.115 -0.11
[0.106] [0.106]*** [0.082]*** [0.092]*** [0.075]*** [0.080]* [0.084]*** [0.447]*** [0.664] [0.379]
Region==ECA -0.559 -0.601 -0.257 -0.383 0.276 0.026 0.342 0.63 0.98 0.06
[0.082]*** [0.082]*** [0.064]*** [0.071]*** [0.053]*** [0.067] [0.059]*** [0.317]* [0.494]* [0.278]
Region==LAC -0.014 0.103 0.121 0.076 0.526 0.157 0.579 0.785 0.619 -0.251
[0.082] [0.082] [0.064]* [0.071] [0.054]*** [0.066]** [0.061]*** [0.353]** [0.522] [0.298]
Region==MENA 0.058 0.098 0.558 0.318 -0.206 -0.297 -0.57 0.138 0.778 0.161
[0.102] [0.102] [0.080]*** [0.088]*** [0.062]*** [0.077]*** [0.069]*** [0.432] [0.591] [0.376]
Region==SA 0.134 0.176 0.46 0.16 -0.584 -0.318 -0.643 -0.588 1.081 0.316
[0.126] [0.126] [0.096]*** [0.107] [0.092]*** [0.106]*** [0.102]*** [0.603] [0.950] [0.496]
Region==SSA -0.117 0.029 0.159 0.095 0.113 0.025 0.256 0.573 0.896 -0.597
[0.120] [0.121] [0.094]* [0.104] [0.078] [0.095] [0.086]*** [0.540] [0.840] [0.463]
Year-fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 983 980 981 983 985 819 992 89 54 97
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.7 0.72 0.71 0.66 0.51 0.57 0.83 0.6 0.71
Standard errors in brackets




  40Table 2-b: Regionally adjusted regression results for stock markets (2000-
2006)





















Log GDP per capita 0.777 1.357 0.482 -0.03 0.048 -0.138 -0.013 0.539
[0.051]*** [0.081]*** [0.054]*** [0.027] [0.055] [0.234] [0.056] [0.058]***
Offshore 0.306 0.285 0.862 -0.428 -0.645 1.131 0.284 -0.047
[0.201] [0.319] [0.188]*** [0.087]*** [0.144]*** [0.641]* [0.146]* [0.201]
Log fuel 0.004 -0.028 -0.03 -0.015 0.034 0.065 -0.018 -0.011
[0.023] [0.037] [0.024] [0.013] [0.028] [0.094] [0.031] [0.025]
Log poverty gap -0.283 -0.553 -0.126 0.142 -0.062 0.822 -0.241 0.018
[0.077]*** [0.127]*** [0.081] [0.035]*** [0.078] [0.368]** [0.079]*** [0.089]
Log population density 0.109 0.079 0.057 -0.011 0.067 0.109 0.078 -0.016
[0.022]*** [0.035]** [0.024]** [0.010] [0.015]*** [0.050]** [0.018]*** [0.025]
Log population size 0.104 0.659 -0.37 -0.01 0.044 0.035 0.123 0.509
[0.023]*** [0.038]*** [0.025]*** [0.011] [0.023]* [0.072] [0.024]*** [0.026]***
GDP per capita * -0.004 -0.018 0.008 -0.017 -0.015 -0.009 -0.007 -0.014
population size [0.003] [0.006]*** [0.004]** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.006] [0.002]*** [0.004]***
Region==EAP 0.994 0.402 -0.113 -0.096 0.62 -1.024 -0.047 -0.328
[0.189]*** [0.309] [0.207] [0.086] [0.163]*** [0.646] [0.164] [0.218]
Region==ECA -0.459 -0.471 0.131 0.002 0.554 -1.919 -0.216 0.032
[0.139]*** [0.225]** [0.152] [0.060] [0.119]*** [0.464]*** [0.118]* [0.156]
Region==LAC 0.429 -1.267 -0.619 -0.079 0.637 -1.534 -0.057 -1.68
[0.146]*** [0.236]*** [0.153]*** [0.066] [0.118]*** [0.454]*** [0.123] [0.163]***
Region==MENA 0.408 -0.073 -0.14 -0.01 0 0.045 -0.353 -0.192
[0.163]** [0.264] [0.173] [0.073] [0.000] [0.730] [0.195]* [0.182]
Region==SA 0.584 1.029 0.723 -0.3 0.355 -1.614 -0.107 0.515
[0.248]** [0.396]*** [0.264]*** [0.105]*** [0.206]* [0.806]** [0.207] [0.278]*
Region==SSA 1.119 0.574 -0.573 -0.21 0.262 -0.305 -0.224 -1.008
[0.219]*** [0.356] [0.234]** [0.105]** [0.184] [0.644] [0.202] [0.252]***
Year-fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 666 667 700 362 263 282 292 671
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.7 0.64 0.5 0.56 0.23 0.35 0.65
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
  41Table 2-c: Regionally adjusted regression results for bond markets (2000-2006) 
















Log GDP per capita 1.638 0.366 1.04 0.319 -0.014
[0.190]*** [0.678] [0.376]*** [0.114]*** [1.199]
Offshore 1.463 -0.512 -0.83 0.421 -5.437
[0.446]*** [1.230] [1.172] [0.277] [3.287]
Log fuel -0.372 0.191 0.179 -0.021 0.059
[0.069]*** [0.412] [0.172] [0.042] [0.765]
Log poverty gap -1.125 0.692 1.579 -0.491 -0.654
[0.323]*** [1.143] [0.612]** [0.166]*** [2.113]
Log population density -0.05 -0.115 0.237 0.08 -0.636
[0.033] [0.250] [0.111]** [0.024]*** [0.314]**
Log population size 0.121 0.24 -0.318 0.162 -0.618
[0.059]** [0.232] [0.139]** [0.035]*** [0.619]
GDP per capita * -0.002 -0.038 0.026 -0.002 0.293
population size [0.004] [0.016]** [0.014]* [0.003] [0.169]*
Region==EAP 1.669 -1.316 1.622 -0.262 -2.225
[0.503]*** [2.000] [1.134] [0.304] [3.991]
Region==ECA -0.167 1.049 -0.369 -0.002 0.977
[0.326] [1.256] [0.772] [0.178] [2.554]
Region==LAC 0.754 -0.525 2.391 -0.263 -0.568
[0.368]** [1.588] [0.763]*** [0.219] [2.723]
Region==MENA 0 -0.133 3.369 1.316 2.308
[0.000] [2.774] [1.665]** [0.280]*** [5.173]
Region==SA 1.763 0.599 2.847 0.277 4.741
[0.815]** [2.341] [1.310]** [0.411] [4.379]
Region==SSA 1.661 0 3.306 0.248 2.25
[0.456]*** [0.000] [1.286]** [0.286] [6.103]
Year-fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 242 54 172 282 52
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.1 0.35 0.38 0.06
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  42Table 2-d: Regionally adjusted regression results for institutional investors (2000-
2006) 














Log GDP per capita 0.685 0.795 0.585 0.908
[0.134]*** [0.122]*** [0.195]*** [0.125]***
Offshore -1.342 0.225 -0.797 -0.537
[0.657]** [0.563] [0.895] [0.561]
Log fuel -0.176 -0.17 -0.147 -0.222
[0.061]*** [0.054]*** [0.083]* [0.053]***
Log poverty gap -0.197 -0.083 -0.269 -0.478
[0.199] [0.188] [0.285] [0.181]***
Log population density -0.004 0.149 -0.154 0.009
[0.064] [0.055]*** [0.084]* [0.053]
Log population size 0.185 0.034 -0.078 -0.017
[0.069]*** [0.060] [0.091] [0.057]
GDP per capita * -0.007 0.001 0.01 0.002
population size [0.008] [0.007] [0.011] [0.007]
Region==EAP -0.003 0.659 1.815 1.578
[0.587] [0.513] [0.813]** [0.514]***
Region==ECA -1.325 -0.343 -1.179 -1.115
[0.377]*** [0.337] [0.518]** [0.327]***
Region==LAC -0.946 -0.064 0.154 -0.097
[0.397]** [0.356] [0.563] [0.354]
Region==MENA -0.868 0.067 0.319 0.021
[0.482]* [0.425] [0.659] [0.416]
Region==SA -1.329 -0.339 0.287 -0.318
[0.677]* [0.589] [0.938] [0.589]
Region==SSA -0.527 1.069 0.875 1.198
[0.604] [0.573]* [0.912] [0.585]**
Year-fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 99 98 99 98
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.68 0.37 0.75
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  43Table 3: Overview of Regional effects Relative to the Rest of the World 





 Net Interest 
Margin / 
Assets 
 ATMs / 
100,000 
People 
 Stock Mrkt 
Cap / GDP 
 Listed 





Bonds / GDP 
 Public 





HI 0.18 -0.05 -0.34 -0.76 0.23 0.25 0.73 0.08 0.09 0.94
2 . 5 2- 0 . 9 0 - 6 . 5 2 - 2 . 7 2 1 . 8 21 . 8 54 . 8 00 . 3 00 . 6 32 . 7 2
SSA -0.14 -0.16 -0.12 -0.41 0.40 -0.24 0.23 0.84 0.37 0.96
-2.23 -3.13 -2.49 -1.22 2.98 -1.65 1.30 2.47 1.72 2.45
EAP 0.28 0.25 -0.37 0.65 0.58 0.04 -0.06 0.71 -0.27 1.58
4.24 4.80 -6.10 1.98 4.44 0.28 -0.34 3.07 -2.10 3.24
MENA 0.23 0.54 -0.33 -0.32 0.35 -0.15 -0.03 0.00 0.99 0.54
2.63 7.70 -5.84 -0.92 2.65 -1.10 -0.18 4.25 1.39
SA 0.26 0.32 -0.67 -0.88 -0.14 0.98 1.15 -0.24 0.24 -0.25
2.68 4.32 -8.29 -1.79 -0.76 5.05 5.18 -0.55 1.28 -0.44
LAC 0.04 0.01 0.46 0.27 -0.11 -0.43 -1.18 -0.22 -0.09 -0.36
0.89 0.26 11.94 1.31 -1.13 -4.33 -10.67 -1.25 -0.78 -1.50
ECA -0.57 -0.48 0.36 0.37 -0.74 0.25 0.39 -0.90 -0.16 -1.25
-9.22 -9.71 8.55 1.60 -7.69 2.30 3.13 -3.45 -1.49 -5.00
The table displays the coefficients of the basic regressions where a single region dummy (1 if in the region, 0 otherwise) was added.  
The number in italics under the coefficient is the t-statistic.  
   












Private credit to GDP 0.35 0.63 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01
Deposits to GDP 0.37 0.50 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.00
Net-interest margin 0.46 0.49 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.01
Stock market capitalization 0.48 0.43 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
Number of listed firms 0.43 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.00
Stock market turnover 0.39 0.32 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.23 -0.03
Assets institutional investors to GDP 0.39 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Private bonds to GDP 0.31 0.66 0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01
Public bonds to GDP 0.55 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.00
Number of ATMs per 100,000 people 0.18 0.79 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
 
 
  44Table 5: Dynamic Analysis (1980-2006) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Log private credit 
via deposit money 
banks to GDP
Log deposits to 
GDP





Time (t=0 in 1960) -0.205 -0.041 -2.09 0.405 0.354
[0.059]*** [0.050] [0.261]*** [0.310] [0.325]
Time squared 0.005 -0.001 0.055 -0.015 -0.008
[0.002]** [0.002] [0.008]*** [0.009] [0.008]
Log GDP per capita 0.305 0.278 -0.069 0.53 0.203
[0.021]*** [0.017]*** [0.103] [0.125]*** [0.163]
Log GDP/capita * time 0.013 0.006 0.058 0.003 -0.041
[0.004]*** [0.003]** [0.014]*** [0.016] [0.018]**
Log GDP/capita * time squared 0 0 -0.001 0 0.001
[0.000]* [0.000] [0.000]*** [0.001] [0.000]**
Offshore 0.112 0.183 3.969 1.363 -2.003
[0.127] [0.106]* [0.522]*** [0.598]** [1.057]*
Offshore * time -0.008 -0.006 -0.307 -0.087 0.182
[0.022] [0.018] [0.077]*** [0.086] [0.115]
Offshore * time squared 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.001 -0.004
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003]*** [0.003] [0.003]
Log fuel -0.103 -0.094 -0.556 -0.292 -0.421
[0.026]*** [0.021]*** [0.096]*** [0.111]*** [0.172]**
Log fuel * time 0.003 0.006 0.05 0.017 0.039
[0.004] [0.003]** [0.012]*** [0.014] [0.018]**
Log fuel * time squared 0 0 -0.001 0 -0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]*** [0.000] [0.000]**
Log population density 0.019 0.075 0.322 0.394 -0.485
[0.022] [0.018]*** [0.093]*** [0.106]*** [0.153]***
Log population density * time 0.007 0.006 -0.019 -0.036 0.043
[0.004]** [0.003]** [0.012] [0.014]*** [0.017]***
Log population density * time squared 000 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]** [0.000]**
Log povert
0 1
y -0.137 -0.159 0.878 0.172 0.623
[0.050]*** [0.042]*** [0.196]*** [0.249] [0.416]
Log poverty * time -0.003 -0.006 -0.087 -0.05 -0.058
[0.008] [0.007] [0.026]*** [0.032] [0.044]
Log poverty * time squared 0 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
[0.000] [0.000]** [0.001]*** [0.001] [0.001]
Log population -0.02 -0.031 -0.786 0.544 0.098
[0.018] [0.015]** [0.093]*** [0.109]*** [0.138]
Log population * time 0.004 -0.002 0.098 -0.02 -0.011
[0.003] [0.003] [0.012]*** [0.014] [0.015]
Log population * time squared 0 0 -0.003 0.001 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]*** [0.000]* [0.000]
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3424 3436 1676 1663 1932
Adjusted R-squared 0.6 0.62 0.52 0.49 0.45
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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